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HOW WELL DOES CONGRESS SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION?t
ABNER J. MIKVAt
Recent attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts
demonstrate congressional dissatisaction with judicial resolution of cer-
tain d47icult constitutional issues. This assault on the federal judiciary
highlights a recurrent issue presented by the doctrine of separation of
powers. whether Congress or the courts are the final arbiters of the
constitutionality of legislative enactments. In this article, Judge Mikva
examines congressional sensitivity to the constitutional issues often
raised in the exercise of legislative power. Using three recent congres-
sional enactments as illustrations, Judge Mikva demonstrates that Con-
gress has neither the institutional nor political capacity to engage in
effective constitutional deliberation. He concludes that Congress should
make more of an effort to screen legislation for possible constitutional
shortcomings and to clarify its motives, but that even if Congress does
so, the courts must continue to examinefully the constitutional implica-
tions of all legislation.
In January of every odd-numbered year, all the newly elected members of
the United States Congress stand in their respective chambers and take an
oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies foreign and domestic."' The importance of this ceremony is under-
scored by the fact that each member's term of office begins only upon the
taking of this oath.2 Just what this commitment means, and what extra re-
sponsibilities each legislator assumes at his swearing-in, however, is unclear.
For the most part, legislative debate does not explore the constitutional impli-
cations of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job of
considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts.
To some extent, Congress' mixed performance is due to the fact that its
proper role in making constitutional judgments has never been firmly defined.
Thomas Jefferson envisioned each of the three branches of government as an
independent guardian of the Constitution, having "the right to decide for itself
what is its duty under the Constitution, without any regard to what the others
t This article was first delivered as the William T. Joyner Lecture on Constitutional Law at
the University of North Carolina School of Law on April 8, 1982.
* U.S. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
J.D. 1951, University of Chicago. Member 91st-92d Congress and 94th-96th Congress.
1. The oath of office is constitutionally required of all members of both the House and
Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3. The form of the oath is prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1976).
2. When a person is elected or appointed to public office he is usually required by law
to do some act preparatory to assuming its duties, as well as to signify its acceptance, and
this is usually termed qualcalion. [In this case the taking of an oath to support the
Constitution.] When this is done he is invested with the office. . ..
Poore v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 192, 196-97 (1914) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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may have decided for themselves under a similar question."'3 Alexander
Hamilton, on the other hand, was not as sanguine about the legislature's abil-
ity to adjudge the constitutional limitations of its own powers. Unlike Jeffer-
son, he was motivated by a fear that with a limited constitution, reservations of
rights and privileges would "amount to nothing" unless courts assumed the
duty to exercise the power of judicial review. To Hamilton, the judiciary was
a necessary bulwark against legislative aggrandizement and majority tyranny. 4
More recently, the debate has focused on the deference due congressional
judgments of constitutionality. Dean John Hart Ely argues that the courts
should intervene only when a statute directly conflicts with a constitutional
proscription or when the legislative process fails to ensure adequate participa-
tion in democratic decisionmaking. 5 In so doing, he accords constitutional
preeminence to the decisions of a legislature that neither insulates identified
minorities nor denies them the rights necessary for full political participation,
while restricting the courts' role to that of policing process. 6
Professor Owen Fiss questions this reliance on the ability of the legisla-
ture to engage in constitutional reasoning, arguing that the courts must play
the predominant role in articulating constitutional values against the new
forms of tyranny implicit in the modem bureaucratic state.7 Like Hamilton,
Fiss is not as optimistic that constitutional requirements will be met merely
through adherence to the majoritarian process. In a contemporary echo of
Hamilton, he questions the legislature's sensitivity to constitutional constraints
upon its powers:
If the legislative process promised to get us closer to the meaning of
our constitutional values, then the theory of legislative failure would
be responsive to this puzzlement. But just the opposite seems true.
Legislatures are entirely of a different order. They are not ideologi-
cally committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of
constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms
of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people-what
they want and what they believe should be done.8
Regardless of the rhetoric that emanates from Congress, the legislature
has for the most part fulfilled the prophecy of Hamilton and left constitutional
judgments to the judiciary. This willingness to step aside has been due in part
to institutional pressures and in part to political convenience. The dangers
inherent in this deference, however, are two-fold. First, by passing the hard
3. 1 THE JEFFERSON ENCYCLOPEDIA 190 (J. Foley ed. 1900).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 492-95 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
5. J. ELY, DEmOcRAcY AND DIsTUST (1980).
6. In addition, although Ely's theory accords Congress the prime responsibility for articulat-
ing constitutional requirements-or admits that all majoritarian decisions are equally constitu-
tional--it provides no guidance to Congress beyond the basic insistence upon a majoritarian
process. See, e.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persittence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE LJ. 1063 (1980).
7. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1 (1980).
8. Id at 9-10.
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questions to the courts, Congress is able to divert political pressure from itself.
As a result, Congress invites the courts either to follow the election returns9 or
to face political attack, including the ultimate attack-restriction or removal of
subject matter jurisdiction.10 The second danger is more subtle, and hence
more worrisome. To the extent the judiciary operates under the assumption
that an independent constitutional determination has been made by the legis-
lature, it may reduce the level of scrutiny it gives to a problem. Reduced judi-
cial scrutiny, however, enhances the possibility that constitutional rights may
be abridged.
The existence of these dangers, however, is not lost on Congress. Con-
gressman Eckhardt of Texas, in speaking against a trend in Congress to "press
as far as [it] can toward the general objective of the statute and let the
Supreme Court worry about unconstitutionality,""II argued that
[t]here is a grave and important difference and result if the constitu-
tional language is stricken at the court level, particularly in the field
of criminal law. In order to correct the constitutional defect the court
must take action in a specific case by reversing a conviction of a per-
son who is at least potentially a dangerous criminal.' 2
Twelve years later, Senator Schmitt, arguing that the Senate should decide for
itself the constitutionality of the legislative veto, stated that the role of consti-
9. Consider the aphorism of Finley Peter Dunne, better known as Mr. Dooley, which states:
"No matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the elec-
tion returns." F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY AT His BEST 77 (E. Ellis ed. 1969).
10. In the first session of the 97th Congress several bills were introduced restricting, or in
some cases removing, jurisdiction from the federal courts, primarily in the areas of school prayer,
abortion, and integration. Those bills concerned with integration limited the availability of bus-
sing as a remedy. See S. 1147, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S4636-37 (daily ed. May 8,
1981); H.R. 3332, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H1674 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1981); S. 1005,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S3953 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1981); S. 528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. S1480 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1981); H.R. 2047, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
H624 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1981); H.R. 1180, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H174 (daily ed.
Jan. 22, 1981); H.R. 1079, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1981);
H.R. 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. HI16 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981); H.R. 761, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H73 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R. 340, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REc. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R. 327, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. H59
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981). The bills dealing with abortion prevented the courts from restraining or
enjoining anti-abortion laws. See H.R. 3225, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H1483 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1981); S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S1624-25 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
1981); S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S287-94 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); H.R. 900,
97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H128 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H116 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981); H.R. 73, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
Rac. H33 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981). The voluntary prayer bills simply removed all federal court
jurisdiction over prayer cases. See H.R. 2347, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. Rc. H808 (daily
ed. Mar. 5, 1981); S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S1281-84 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981);
H.R. 1335, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H213 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1981); H.R. 989, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H132 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. HI 16 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981); H.R. 408, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
H61 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); H.R. 326,97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H59 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1981); H.R. 72, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H33 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981). For a more
detailed description of the same, see Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term-Foreword" Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congress' 4uthority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARv. L. REv. 17, 18 n.3 (1981).
11. 116 CONG. REC. 35,288 (1970) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt).
12. Id
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tutional interpreter should not be exclusive to the courts. 13 He noted, for in-
stance, that under the political question doctrine there exist constitutional
issues whose resolution is committed to the political branches to the exclusion
of the judiciary. 14 He added,
Moreover, courts often accord a challenged law a "presumption of
constitutionality" based upon the assumption that the legislature has
previously passed upon the constitutional questions presented. Even
where judicial deference is attenuated, the courts may lack the insti-
tutional capacity to review all aspects of legislative decisions, such as
the subjective motivations of the lawmakers. Here, if the Constitu-
tion is to be applied at all, it must be applied by ourselves as
lawmakers.' 5
The focus of this article is the extent to which these dangers are a reality
and what, if anything, should be done about them. The article begins by ex-
amining three separate instances of congressional constitutional deliberation:
(1) the 1974 extension of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to employees of state and local governments;' 6 (2) the adoption
of a legislative veto provision by the Senate in the currently pending amend-
ments to the Administrative Procedure Act; 17 and (3) the provision of the 1970
Organized Crime Control Act allowing for increased sentences for dangerous
special offenders upon appellate review.' 8 These examples raise questions
concerning Congress' ability to make constitutional judgments and its role as
guardian of the Constitution. Although the potential for Congress to play an
important role in constitutional decisionmaking exists, that potential has not
been realized. This article concludes that Congress should make more of an
effort to screen legislation for possible constitutional shortcomings and to clar-
ify its motives as an aid to the courts, but that even if it does so, the courts
should examine to the fullest extent the constitutional implications of every
piece of legislation.
I. CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE CONSTITUTION
The three examples of congressional constitutional debate show Congress
legislating in three different areas of legislative concern with varying levels of
constitutional implications. In the first, the consideration of the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, Congress invoked the commerce power in an
13. 128 CONG. REC. S2581 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Schmitt).
14. Id
15. id
16. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58-62 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-204, 207,
213, 216, 255, 260 (1976)).
17. The "Regulatory Reform Act," S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S4228-43
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1981), is a series of proposed amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act,
ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3106, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5362, 7521 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The Senate added the legislative veto provision
to S. 1080 with the adoption of amendment 847. S. 1080, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONo. REC.
S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1981); see infra note 56.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
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area it considered free of constitutional doubt. In the second, the considera-
tion by the Senate of a legislative veto provision, Congress chose to redefine
the separation of powers doctrine in a manner that seems counter to the dic-
tates of the Constitution. In the third, the discussion of the appellate review of
sentencing provision in the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress dealt with
individual rights, and its determination of constitutionality was later reviewed
by the Supreme Court. While these examples are not exhaustive, they are
good illustrations of Congress' relationship with the Constitution.
A. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974
After two years of debate and one presidential veto, Congress enacted the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,19 extending the breadth of cover-
age and the minimum wage level set by the Fair Labor Standards Act 20 so as
to eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well being of
workers."2 1 Among the provisions adopted by these amendments was one
bringing employees of state and local governments within the purview of the
Act.2 2 The reasons for this extension were threefold: Congress felt (1) that the
government should be subject to the same standards as private employers;
(2) that employees of state and local governments should not subsidize their
employers by working for less than the minimum wage; and (3) that since
these workers were already subject as public employees to wage ceilings, fair-
ness dictated that they also be protected by a wage floor.2 3 Two years later the
Supreme Court held this extension unconstitutional in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery because it "directly displace[d] the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 24
The result came as a complete surprise to Congress. What little constitu-
tional discussion there had been in Congress had centered on whether it was
appropriate to invoke the commerce power to extend the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act to governmental employees. The Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, responsible for reporting out the bill, found an explicit link
between the wages paid to state and local government employees and inter-
state commerce. In its words,
The Committee believes that there is no doubt that the activities
of public sector employers affect interstate commerce and therefore
19. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-08, 210,212-14, 216, 255, 260
(1976)).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19, 255, 260 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
21. Id § 202(a) (1976).
22. Prior to 1974, federal law defined "employer" to include "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivison of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976). The 1974
Amendments struck the language beginning with "but shall." Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88
Stat. 55, 58 (1974).
23. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AMEND-
MENTS OF 1974, S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 [hereinafter cited as FLSA-SENATE].
24. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
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that the Congress may regulate them pursuant to its power to regu-
late interstate commerce. Without question, the activities of govern-
ment at all levels affect commerce. Governments purchase goods
and services on the open market, they collect taxes and spend money
for a variety of purposes. In addition, the salaries they pay their em-
ployees have an impact both on local economies and on the economy
of the nation as a whole. The Committee finds that the volume of
wages paid to government employees and the activities and magni-
tude of all levels of government have an effect on commerce as
well.2
5
The opponents of the extension protested that it represented an "unjustified
intrusion upon areas of state sovereignty. '26 Yet the opponents' arguments
did not rise to the level of constitutionality; rather, they argued that the exten-
sion was merely "unwarranted. '27
The reason for the lack of constitutional debate was the assumption on
the part of Congress that the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Maryland v.
Wirtz28 had settled the issue. In Wirtz Justice Harlan, writing for an eight-
member majority, upheld an earlier extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to employees of hospitals and schools operated by state and local governments
against challenges based on federalism and separation of powers. In holding
that the commerce power provided a constitutional basis for the extension of
the Act, the Court stated that (1) Congress had interfered with state functions
only to the point of subjecting the state to the same limitations as other em-
ployers whose activities affected commerce; (2) labor conditions in schools and
hospitals could affect commerce; and (3) if a state engaged in economic activi-
ties that could be validly regulated if engaged in by a private person, the fed-
eral government could require a state to conform to those same regulations.
29
In its report on the 1974 Amendment, the House Committee on Education and
Labor quoted liberally from the syllabus of the case and cited the holding in
full. 30 While the Senate Report did not mention the case explicitly, the links it
drew between state wages and interstate commerce demonstrate that the Sen-
ate committee had the case in mind.3' In fact, the only challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the amendments came from Senator Taft, who stated,
I. . . question the constitutionality of extending the requirements of
the act to such employees, although the theories of the Supreme
25. FLSA-SENATE, supra note 23, at 24.
26. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF
1973, H.R. REP. No. 232, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (minority views) [hereinafter cited as FLSA-
HousE]. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1973 were the same amendments as those
enacted in 1974. The 1973 Amendments, enacted by Congress in August 1973, were vetoed by
President Nixon on September 6, 1973, on the ground that they would add to unemployment and
inflation. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 147, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
27. FLSA-HousE, supra note 26.
28. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
29. Id at 193-99.
30. FLSA-HousE, supra note 26, at 6-7.
31. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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Court decisions of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) may be arguably extended to in-
clude coverage of such employees under the act.
32
What is clear from the legislative history is that the line of reasoning in
National League of Cities v. Usery3 3-that the federal government may not
interfere with integral governmental functions in areas of traditional state con-
cern-was not anticipated. Congress had assumed on the basis of Maryland v.
Wirtz that it had the power to act as it did. It did not conduct an independent
constitutional review on its own, largely because it probably did not see the
need. Maryland v. Wirtz seemed directly on point, and the imposition on state
and local governments did not seem to raise a constitutional issue.
34
B. The Legislative Veto
The second example, the Senate's review of a legislative veto provision in
amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, involves a situation in
which the constitutionality of the legislative proposal was, at the very least,
suspect. Employed to review both adjudicatory and rulemaking decisions of
administrative agencies, the legislative veto allows either house of Congress, or
in some cases both houses, to veto a decision by the executive branch. While it
may be an effective means of controlling agency discretion, the legislative veto
is subject to four basic constitutional challenges. The first involves the doc-
trine of separation of powers.35 By retaining direct control over delegated ad-
ministrative power, Congress intrudes upon the executive branch and begins
to exercise administrative discretion. Because the veto procedure circumvents
the executive, Congress, in effect, makes the President a subordinate. The sec-
ond challenge concerns section 7 of article I of the Constitution,3 6 which re-
32. 120 CONG. REC. 5268 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft).
33. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
34. Congress decided the imposition would be too burdensome if applied to policemen and
firemen and consequently enacted a special overtime exemption provision. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(c)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 55, 60 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). This was not done, however, for constitutional reasons, but
rather, "to minimize any adverse effects of overtime requirements by providing for a phase-in of
those public employees who are most frequently required to work more than forty hours per
week." FLSA-SENATE, supra note 23, at 24.
35. The most recent Supreme Court opinion discussing this doctrine is Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 118-43 (1976) (per curiam). The principle behind the doctrine is that diffusion of authority
prevents abuses of power by any one branch of government. As Justice Brandeis noted:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined
1983]
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quires that any law promulgated must be passed by both houses of Congress.
A legislative veto procedure that allows one house of Congress to make a final
determination seems to run afoul of this requirement. A third possible chal-
lenge involves the "presentation" requirement of article I, section 7 that a bill
must be presented to the President before it can become a law, a mandate that
is not met by a legislative veto provision.3 7 The fourth challenge involves the
doctrine of undue delegation, a theory occasionally resurrected by the
Supreme Court to combat any standardless delegation of powers from Con-
gress to the executive or to administrative agencies.38 The doctrine is impli-
cated by the legislative veto because the guidance Congress provides the
executive branch comes after rather than before the powers have been
delegated.
Given these challenges and congressional enactment of a wide range of
legislative veto and review procedures over the last fifty years,39 it is surprising
by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by
the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The "bicameralism requirement" is designed to prevent the promul-
gation of legislation unless both houses concur. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356-57 (J.
Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 336-38 (1911).
37. The purpose of the presidential veto, as set forth in the "presentment" clause, see supra
note 36, was ably outlined by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist:
The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to ab-
sorb the powers, of the other departments has been already sugested and repeated; the
insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each has also been
remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own
defense, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles re-
sults the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive upon the
acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be abso-
lutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradu-
ally be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single
vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might
speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discov-
ered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just
reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to
be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power
of self-defense.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 468-69 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). Any legislative veto
provision encroaches on the President's ability to protect his authority and to check unwise
legislation.
38. The heyday of the doctrine of undue delegation is well past. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). It has
not yet been removed from the Supreme Court's arsenal. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 90-91 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id at 91-93 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974). Re-
cently a number of commentators have called for the doctrine's revival. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra
note 5, at 131-34; Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, andExecutive Policy-Making, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Summer 1976, at 46, 49-65; McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of.Delegated Power,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1127-30 (1977).
39. In the 96th Congress alone, 32 laws were enacted containing some form of a legislative
review or veto procedure: Veterans Health Care Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-22, 93 Stat.
47; Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-60, 93
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that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed their constitutionality.4g The
final word may not be long in coming, however, as the Supreme Court has
already heard argument in a case involving this issue.
41
Both of the circuit courts of appeals that have considered legislative veto
provisions have found them to be unconstitutional.42 In Chadha v. Immigra-
Stat. 395 (1979); Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 (1979); Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503;
Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1979); Health Planning Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat.
592; Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979); Emer-
gency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 749; District of Columbia
Retirement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-122, 93 Stat. 866 (1979); Department of Interior and
Related Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954 (1979); Depart-
ment of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-132, 93 Stat.
1040 (1979); Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
151, 93 Stat. 1092; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93
Stat. 1339; United States Insular Areas Appropriations Authorizations, Pub. L. No. 96-205, 94
Stat. 84 (1980); Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229; Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980); Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374; Energy Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act Appro-
priations Authorization, Pub. L. No. 96-332, 94 Stat. 1057 (1980); Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208; Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-367, 94 Stat. 1331 (1980); Education Amendments of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367; Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-464,94 Stat. 2060; Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
482, 94 Stat. 2334; Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (1980); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767; Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations,
1981, Pub. L. No. 96-514, 94 Stat. 2957 (1980); National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987; Department of Housing and Urban Development-In-
dependent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044 (1980); Interna-
tional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131;
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 96-539, 94 Stat. 3194 (1980);
Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-592, 94 Stat. 3437.
40. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), Justice White expressed his view that the legisla-
tive veto is constitutional. Id at 257 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
compared the one house veto to disapproval of proposed legislation and argued that the purpose
of the Presidential veto is not implicated by a review of agency rulemaking because such rulemak-
ing is legislative in nature. Further, Justice White stated:
I would be much more concerned if Congress purported to usurp the functions of
law enforcement, to control the outcome of particular adjudications, or to pre-empt the
President's appointment power, but in the light of history and modern reality, the provi-
sion for congressional disapproval of agency regulations does not appear to transgress
the constitutional design, at least where the President has agreed to legislation establish-
ing the disapproval procedure or the legislation has been passed over his veto.
Id at 285-86. Justice White was the only Justice to address this issue, with the majority disposing
of the case on other grounds. Id at 140 n.176 (per curiam).
41. On October 5, 1981, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chadha v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812 (1981). The Court
heard argument on February 22, 1982. See 50 U.S.L.W. 3687, 3687-89 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982). The
Chadha case was reargued on Dec. 7, 1982. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3453, 3453-55 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1982).
42. The Court of Claims has also addressed this issue and reached the opposite result. In
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), the court
upheld a Senate veto of the President's salary recommendations for federal judges, a procedure
provided for in the Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 644. (current version at
2 U.S.C. § 359 (Supp. IV 1980)). Focusing narrowly on the one-house veto provision in the Salary
Act, the court held the veto neither conflicted with Congress" constitutional powers and obliga-
tions nor intruded on the constitutional sphere of the President. 556 F.2d at 1059. The court
noted that the power to fix appropriations is lodged in Congress under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
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don & Naturalization Service43 the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional the
one-house veto of a decision by the INS under 80 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976) to
suspend deportation because of hardship. To decide when one branch uncon-
stitutionally invades powers implicitly committed to another, the court formu-
lated the following test: The doctrine of separation of powers is violated when
one branch assumes powers that are central or essential to the second, pro-
vided that this assumption of power disrupts the second branch's performance
of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate governmental pol-
icy.44 Noting that deportation proceedings, including suspension proceedings,
are subject to administrative safeguards set out by statute and to judicial re-
view, the court delineated three possible justifications for and interpretations
of the veto: (1) it is an effort by Congress to correct judicial or executive mis-
application of the statutory criteria for suspension of deportation; (2) it repre-
sents an ongoing effort by Congress to share administration of the immigration
statute with the executive; or (3) it is an exercise by Congress of its residual
powers to define substantive rights by statute. Addressing the first interpreta-
tion, the court found that the veto unconstitutionally interfered with the judici-
ary's power to review executive action and to engage in statutory
interpretation.4 5 Focusing on the second justification, the veto was held to be
an unnecessary interference with the executive function-unnecessary because
Congress can and should articulate statutory criteria for suspension of depor-
tation and leave implementation of the criteria to the executive. 4 6 Finally,
responding to the third interpretation, the court found the veto to be a legisla-
tive action that failed to meet constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentation to the President under article I, section 7.47
Most recently, in Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission48 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978.49 The Act directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to implement an incremental pricing program, shifting costs arising
due to deregulation from residential to industrial users. FERC's rules were to
take effect, however, only if neither house of Congress adopted a resolution
disapproving the rule, and, in fact, the House of Representatives vetoed one
7; that the veto could be authorized under the necessary and proper clause as a means chosen by
Congress to supervise presidential exercise of delegated powers; that bicameralism is not required
because rejection of salary recommendations is analogous to the refusal to pass a statute, rather
than to the adoption of a new law; and that the veto did not infringe upon the President's own veto
power because the President can simply fail to recommend increased salaries, thereby forcing
Congress to pass a new salary statute. 556 F.2d at 1060-65.
43. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980); cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812 (1981); see supra note 41.
44. Id at 425.
45. Id at 429-33.
46. Id
47. Id at 433-34.
48. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (Supp. IV 1980). The legislative veto provision is found at
§ 3342(c).
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rule. The reasons given in the House for such action were several.50 Those
who had originally supported the program argued that circumstances had
changed and that the veto provision had been included to give Congress a
second look.51 Those who had opposed the incremental pricing policy in 1978
again argued that it was unwise.52 Others merely noted that the rule was
either too broad or too narrow. 53 The court held that the veto cast by the
House was an unconstitutional exercise of the legislative power, violating both
the bicameralism and presentation requirements of article I, section 7.54 It
added that while agencies may, of course, exercise rulemaking power pursuant
to congressional delegation, Congress may not set forth an initial policy deter-
mination in the form of legislation and then reevaluate it and issue a new
policy determination via the exercise of the legislative veto.
55
It is against this background that the Senate in March of 1982 undertook
consideration of Amendment 847 to S. 1080, a series of proposed amendments
to the Administrative Procedure Act. Amendment 847 provides that no final
rule of an agency shall become effective until forty-five days of continuous
session after it is submitted to Congress, provided, however, that both houses
do not pass a resolution of disapproval.56 In the words of its author, Senator
Schmitt:
The amendment would add elements of deliberation, compromise,
and consensus that are the hallmark of a representative policymaking
body that is directly accountable to the people they serve and on
whom the subject rules will directly impact .... Thus the legisla-
tive veto provides for a measure of control and accountability over
administrative lawmaking that is totally absent from S. 1080.
57
In presenting the amendment, Senator Schmitt criticized the opinion of
the D.C. Circuit in Consumer Energy Council ofAmerica v. FERC as reflecting
"an idealized conception of the separation of powers that is neither historically
50. 673 F.2d at 437 & n.31.
51. Id at 438 & n.32.
52. Id at 438 & n.33.
53. Id at 438 & n.34.
54. Id at 448-70.
55. Id at 466-70.
56. Amendment 847 to S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REa. S2572-73 (daily ed.
Mar. 23, 1982), provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no recommended final rule of an
agency may become effective until the expiration of a period of 45 days of continuous
session of Congress after the date on which the rule is received by the Congress under
paragraph (4) of this subsection. If before the expiration of such 45-day period, either
appropriate committee orders reported or is discharged from consideration of a resolu-
tion of disapproval with respect to such rule, such rule may not become effective if within
30 days of continuous session of Congress after the date on which such committee orders
reported or is discharged from further consideration of such resolution, one House of
Congress agrees to such resolution of disapproval of the rule and within 30 additional
days of continuous session of Congress after the date of transmittal of the resolution of
disapproval to the other House such other House agrees to such resolution of
disapproval.
See also supra note 17.
57. 128 CONG. Rac. S2578 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Schmitt).
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accurate nor has, until now, been actually applied to overturn an act of Con-
gress." s58 He called upon his fellow senators to uphold their constitutional duty
to consider the constitutional implications of their actions and reminded them
that "the rulings of [the D.C. Circuit] have not achieved an especially inspiring
record of approval before the High Court of late, particularly when it has dealt
with issues concerning disputes over the constitutional prerogatives between
the Congress and the executive."'59 In Senator Schmitt's opinion, Congress'
ability to make a constitutional judgment was in no way diminished by the
fact that it was a legislative rather than a judicial body.60 The reasons he gave
for this were several: legislation is drafted and reviewed by lawyers; the bills
are subject to comment by interested parties and views of legal experts may be
solicited; the reporting committee can call on the research talents of its own
staff or the attorneys at the American Law Division of the Library of Con-
gress; and the debate on the floor may center on constitutional questions, a
task not unfamiliar to the various members, as a majority are lawyers.
A number of Schmitt's colleagues were not as convinced of the propriety
of the amendment, however. Senators Leahy and Danforth spearheaded an
effort to table the amendment. They argued that the pendency of the issue
before the Supreme Court, as well as the D.C. Circuit decision in a very simi-
lar case that resolved the constitutional doubts against the veto provision,
mandated against joining the uncertain provision to a bill that had taken a
number of years to put together.61 Senators Ford and Cannon went even fur-
58. Id
59. Id at S2580.
60. Id at S2581.
61. See 128 CONO. REc. S2588 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Leahy):
I think these proposals [for a legislative veto] place regulatory reform in an arena of
constitutional doubt.
As I said, this proposal speaks volumes about the frustration that virtually every one
of us in Congress has felt when executive agencies have failed to follow our legislative
mandates. But I think the two-House veto, especially as presented, without a Presiden-
tial veto, raises substantial questions about the maintenance of separation of powers
under the Constitution.
I suggest, if we were to have such a decision, whether it is in the Chadha case or
whenever it might be, that that is the time for us to sit down. When we have the
Supreme Court decision in hand, that will be the time to write a piece of legislative veto
legislation.
See also 128 CONG. REc. S2596 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Danforth):
Mr. President, there could not conceivably be a worse time for the Congress of the
United States to put in place a Government-wide legislative veto than is the case today.
The timing is so bad for this amendment that it is as though a computer had been
asked what is the worse conceivable time to proceed full-speed ahead with a Govern-
ment-wide legislative veto. Surely, any computer that was asked that question would
come up with the answer, "Right now, in early 1982. This is the worst conceivable time
for a legislative veto."
Why so? Because, Mr. President, I believe it is fair to say that never in the history of
the country has the concept of the legislative veto been more in flux than it is today.
We have heard many Senators today talk about the question of the constitutionality
of the legislative veto. When the Senator from New Mexico called up this amendment,
at the very outset he discussed the question of constitutionality. Why did he discuss the
constitutionality of the legislative veto?
The answer to that question is that this is a live matter right now before the
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ther, arguing that the amendment should be tabled because it was
unconstitutional.
62
In pointing to the practical problems of a generalized use of the veto, the
opponents echoed the analysis of Judge McGowan, 63 who argued that Con-
gress cannot possibly review all administrative regulations thoroughly, that to
insist upon congressional review might delay the implementation of regula-
tions unnecessarily, and that inconsistent use of the veto by the House and the
Senate may frustrate the regulatory enterprise. Even more importantly, the
use of the veto might increase Congress' tendency to pass the hard issues onto
agencies, to propose increasingly standardless legislation, and then to join the
public in deriding the results.64 It would be far better, Judge McGowan con-
cluded, for each branch of government to function within its own constitu-
tional sphere and for a "Congress genuinely concerned about delegated power
Supreme Court of the United States. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
held the legislative veto unconstitutional. That case is on appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held the legislative veto unconstitu-
tional. That case is on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in fact has been argued
before the Supreme Court. . . .Despite the fact that constitutionality is now a real case
in controversy before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Senate of the United
States today considers whether this precise time is the time to barge full speed ahead by
putting in place a specific form of the legislative veto, Goverment-wide, for all rules and
regulations, whether they were major rules or minor rules.
Mr. President, the question of constitutionality of the legislative veto has been de-
bated back and forth in the Senate today. . . . This is not the forum for debating the
issue of constitutionality of the legislative veto. The fact of the matter is that it is irrele-
vant whether we debate it in the Senate; the issue is going to be decided one way or
another by the Supreme Court of the United States.
My view is that while the case is before the Supreme Court, pending a determina-
tion by the Supreme Court of the issue that is before it, let us wait for the Supreme Court
to speak. Then, if we want to have a legislative veto, let us fashion a form of legislative
veto which complies with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
62. See 128 CONG. REC. § 2593 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Ford):
I say today we are not only flying in the face of the courts, but we are saying to the
general public. We want this legislative veto, and that legislative veto will restrain the
agencies.
What in the world are we restraining? Nothing. Those bureaucrats downtown, or
wherever they are, are developing these regulations. They spend their time, they spend
their money, and then they send them up here and then we override them we veto them.
Why do we not go the other end and regulate the agencies by law so that they will
know where they are going, what bounds they have to operate in? Then we will not have
to worry about a legislative veto that will create havoc.
It is unconstitutional and yet we sit here and say we are going to have a legislative
veto, we are going to look over their shoulders.
See also 128 CONG. REC. S2593-94 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Cannon):
My opposition to the legislative veto as a substitute for effective congressional over-
sight has been vigorous and longstanding.
Two years ago, I argued against imposing a legislative veto on rules of the Federal
Trade Commission. At that time, I stated that the veto appeared to violate the Constitu-
tion. Two U.S. circuit courts, the ninth circuit and the D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal,
recently decided that the veto is indeed unconstitutional ....
I share Senator Schmitt's concern about regulatory excesses, and I, too, believe Con-
gress must get Federal agencies under control. The way to do this is not through an
elaborate process of vetoing each and every Federal regulation, but through changing
specific statutory mandates.
63. McGowan, supra note 38.
64. Id at 1146-47.
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[to make the] one effective contribution that it, and only it, can make-the
identification and definition, as precisely as possible, of that power, and of the
standards to be observed in its exercise." 65 Both the policy and the constitu-
tional arguments went unheeded, however, and the amendment passed 69-
25.66
The debates on this issue took place against a backdrop of constitutional
uncertainty. Those Senators in favor of the legislative veto provision went to
great lengths to assert the need for Congress to make its own judgment of
constitutionality. Opponents of the provision stressed the timing of that judg-
ment, arguing that the most sensible approach was to await the Supreme Court
decision on the merits. On the matter of constitutionality, the debates, to the
extent they took place, are filled with self-serving conclusory congressional
discussion, the value of which is not easy to determine. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the constitutionality of the provision was only one factor that was
considered in the Senate's vote on the amendment and that it may not have
been the most important.
C. Section 3576 of the Organized Crime ControlAct
Joining with President Nixon in a nationwide war against crime, Con-
gress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.67 The Act was
designed to strengthen the legal tools in gathering evidence, to establish new
penal provisions, and to provide new remedies to deal with the unlawful activ-
ities of those engaged in organized crime.68 Among these reforms was Title X,
designed to counter the tendency on the part of some trial judges to mete out
light sentences in cases involving organized crime personnel.69 It authorized
extended sentences of up to twenty-five years for dangerous special offenders
and included in section 3576 a provision for appellate review of those
sentences, allowing the government to seek an increased sentence. 70 Despite
65. Id at 1174.
66. 128 CONG. REC. S2604 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982).
67. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
68. 116 CONG. REc. 35,191 (1970) (statement of Rep. Sisk).
69. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:
For such offenders and for professional and habitual criminals, the most applicable pur-
pose of punishment is protection of the public against further criminal conduct by inca-
pacitation through incarceration or long-term close supervision. The failure to serve thatpurpose, when a prison term suitable for an ordinary offender is imposed upon an organ-
ized crime leader, is obvious. The source of that failure les, in large part, in inadequate
maximum terms for special offenders, lack of standards for identifying them, and un-
availability of appellate power to increase inadequate individual sentences.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. 87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as OCCA-SENATE]. The Committee argued that
"[t]he primary purpose of title X, therefore, is to see to it that convicted felons prone to engage in
further crime are imprisoned long enough to give to society reasonable protection." Id at 83.
70. This particular provision was an amendment to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, establishing a
new § 3576. It provides in pertinent part:
[A] review of the sentence on the record of the sentencing court may be taken by the
defendant or the United States to a court of appeals .... Review of the sentence shall
include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were
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the controversy over this last provision in both the House and the Senate, it
was enacted and later upheld by a 5-4 majority in the Supreme Court.7 1 Thus,
the Act provides an example of Supreme Court review of a piece of legislation
that had been the subject of congressional constitutional debate.
The bill that eventually passed was first introduced in the Senate.72 After
testimony from various law professors and legal organizations, including the
American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the De-
partment of Justice, the Committee on the Judiciary, without any constitu-
tional hesitations,73 reported the bill to the floor and recommended its
passage. In adopting the bill, the Committee had relied heavily on the testi-
mony of the Department of Justice and Professor Peter Low of the University
of Virginia Law School, which centered on the relevance of the then recent
Supreme Court opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce.7 4 In Pearce the Court
held that an increase in the term of a sentence after a reversal of conviction did
not constitute double jeopardy. Those in favor of the bill stressed the fact that
a sentence increase procedure had been validated.75 Those opposed empha-
sized that the sentence could only be increased if the original conviction had
been overturned, 76 arguing that the review provision in section 3576 allowed
clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused. The court of appeals
on review of the sentence may, after considering the record, including the entire
presentence report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sen-
tencing hearing, and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the sen-
tence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court could
originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and imposition of
sentence, except that a sentence may be made more severe only on review of the sentence
taken by the United States and after hearing.
18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
71. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
72. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
73. OCCA-SENATE, supra note 69. None of the Senators who spoke on S. 30 objected to any
of the provisions on constitutional grounds. Senator Scott felt it necessary to expound on the evils
of organized crime but concluded that the bill was "a careful attempt to accommodate the public
interest in effective law enforcement with individual rights in a specific and complex area of crimi-
nal law." Id at 211, 214 (Additional views of Mr. Scott). Senators Kennedy and Hart stated that
"the reach of this bill goes beyond organized criminal activity. Most of its features propose sub-
stantial changes in the general body of criminal procedures," but did not elaborate. Id at 215
(Individual views of Messrs. Hart and Kennedy).
74. 395 U.S. 711 (1969); OCCA-SENATE, supra note 69 at 93-100 (specifically discussing con-
stitutionality of appellate review with power to increase sentences).
75. See, e.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 544
(testimony of Professor Low) ("the double jeopardy and equal protection arguments that could be
made against an increased sentence on appeal are weakened if not completely destroyed [by the
decision in Pearce]") [hereinafter cited as Measures Relating to Organized Crime]; OCCA-SENATE,
supra note 69, at 96 ("The Pearce decision has significance here because it rejected the commonly
held broad view that under the double jeopardy clause any sentence pronounced in a case sets a
ceiling which cannot be exceeded except by traditional trial court revision during the term of
court."); 116 CONG. REc. 593 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("Supreme Court decisions
rendered last term [Pearce], and lengthy and detailed hearings into the legal and constitutional
aspects of appellate review of sentences, have indicated that the concept can be implemented as
title X does within constitutional bounds.").
76. "In the recent case of North Carolina v. Pearce ... the Supreme Court held that due
process barred a judge from increasing a presentence after a new trial unless the defendant's iden-
tifiable conduct subsequent to the original sentencing supports the more severe sentence as is
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the appellate court to increase the sentence on the same set of facts that the
trial court had used in determining the sentence. The Committee had been
particularly taken with Professor Low's argument that, although the focus was
different, section 3576 substantively resembled other available constitutional
alternatives that Congress could have chosen and therefore should be
constitutional.
77
The debate on the floor was one-sided, and it is safe to say that most
members would have agreed with Senator Mansfield, when he said,
[S]ometimes I wish I were a lawyer. At other times I am very glad
that I never entered that profession.
We have now spent 3 days on this bill, with the lawyers, by and
large, arguing over the fine points of the proposed legislation which
has been a year in the making.
Undoubtedly there are bugs in this bill, as there are in almost
any bill which the Senate passes. But I think the issue is so important
that, insofar as the bugs are concerned, we might well consider
resolving our doubts in favor of the legislation, so that we can attack
a menace which is becoming more and more difficult to cope with in
this city and in this Nation.
Therefore, I hope that the Senate will go on record today with a
solid vote and support for this legislation, so that we can indicate that
we are ready to cope with the growing criminality which is becoming
so prevelant [sic] and so hard to control throughout the Nation, and
do it with a big bang today.
78
The bill passed 73-1.
79
The bill faced a stiffer test in the House, although the outcome was the
same. There, Representatives Conyers, Ryan, and the author of this article,
then a Representative from Illinois, wrote a dissenting report to the House
made part of the record." 116 CONrG. REc. 855 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) (ALCU report
entered into record by Sen. Young).
77. Professor Low had made these observations:
[T]here would seem to be ways of putting the increase [sic] power so that it would be
very difficult to suggest constitutional infirmity. One would be to permit the sentencing
court only to "recommend" a sentence to the appellate court, the "recommendation" to
become final if neither side appealed within so many days. If an appeal were taken by
either side, the issue could then be resolved de novo by the appellate court. A second
way would be to analogize the situation to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (commitment for study)
and have the trial court imJose a sentence that would be "deemed" to be for the maxi-
mum, with a recommendation that the appellate court "reduce" the sentence to a certain
level, a recommendation that would become the sentence if neither side appealed, but
which would not bind the appellate court if an appeal was taken.
Both of these devices are clearly artificial, and in substance obviously involve no
more than would be involved if a direct appeal of the sentence were allowed to the
Government. But the fact that they can be suggested with some plausibility, and that it
would be difficult to say that they offended any principles rooted in the double jeopardy
clause, is suggestive of the fact that the proposal here may well be constitutional.
Measures Relating to Organized Crime, supra note 75, at 196 (testimony of Professor Low). "The
committee agree[d] with Professor Low that no such artificial technique should be or need be
employed." OCCA-SENATE, supra note 69, at 98.
78. 116 CONG. REc. 971 (1970) (statement of Sen. Mansfield).
79. Id at 972.
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Committee on the Judiciary's endorsement of the Act.80 Citing lVorth Carolina
v. Pearce8 ' and the recommendations of the advisory committee on the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards of Justice,82 we argued:
Title X, were it not such a dangerous special offender itself,
would be ludicrous, the product of a caveman's course on the Consti-
tution. As it is, it contravenes the Constitution, it substitutes revenge
for reason, and it flaunts the concept of fair treatment. It is [a] par-
ody of justice made tragic by the damage it will do-to individuals,
and more important, to our system of rule by law.
83
We carried our fight to the floor,84 where, for the most part, these arguments
were met with indifference, for as Congressman Yates stated, "It is hard to
vote against a bill which states in its title that it seeks to control organized
crime."8 5 A sample response was made by Congressman Ichord, who ad-
dressed the following question to this author: "I agree with the gentleman that
we are setting up extraordinary measures and vehicles to solve the problems
created by organized crime, but does the gentleman not believe that organized
crime within the Nation does present a problem of sizable proportions?"
8 6
The supporters of the bill, armed with the finding of a Gallup poll that 75% of
those interviewed thought the courts did not deal harshly enough with
criminals,87 flatly stated,
The appellate review provisions of title X have been drawn with
great care so as to avoid infringing individual rights under the due
process and double jeopardy clauses. Supreme Court decisions ren-
dered last term, and lengthy and detailed hearings into the legal and
constitutional aspects of appellate review of sentences, have indi-
cated that the concept can be implemented at [sic] title X does with
constitutional bounds. Appellate review under title X will not only
permit correction of unjust sentences in particular cases, it will also
promote the evolution of sentencing principles and enhance respect
80. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 181-96 (1970) (dissenting views of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.,
Rep. Abner Mikva, Rep. William F. Ryan).
81. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
82. The existence of such a power could well have the effect of preventing the defendant
from appealing even on the merits of his conviction. The ability to seek an increase
could be a powerful club, the very existence of which--even assuming its good faith
use-might induce a defendant to leave well enough alone. ABA Standards on Appel-
late Review of Sentences 57 (1967).
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1970) (dissenting views of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.,
Rep. Abner Mikva, Rep. William F. Ryan).
83. Id
84. The bill was reported to the floor on October 6, 1970. 116 CONG. REc. 35,191 (1970)
(statement of Rep. Sisk). Congressman Poff then spoke in defense of the bill, in opposition to the
dissenting views outlined in the House Report. Id at 35,191-95 (statement of Rep. Poff). The
debates quickly turned to the subject of increased sentences on appellate review. See, e.g., id at
35,207 (statements of Rep. Ryan); Id at 35,213 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id at 35,301, 35,349-
50 (statement of Rep. Dennis); id at 35,305 (statement of Rep. Railsback); id at 35,350 (statement
of Rep. Poff); id at 35,351 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
85. Id at 35,353 (statement of Rep. Yates).
86. Id (statement of Rep. Ichord).
87. Id at 35,194 (statement of Rep. Pofi).
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for our system of justice. It promises a major improvement in the
administration of justice.88
The bill passed 341 to 26,89 despite the author's remonstrance that:
Those who have been here for the debate in the committee are
aware that even the proponents of this bill find it less than perfect. I
am sure some Members will [salve] their consciences by saying that,
after all, the constitutionality of some of these disputed provisions
can be determined by the courts. It seems to me a little unfair to
dump that whole burden on the courts, since they are less able to
protect themselves and their forum is less efficacious than ours. We,
too, take an oath to protect and uphold the Constitution, and we
have a burden equal to theirs, if not greater. 90
Section 3576 came before the Supreme Court in 1980 in the case of United
States v. DiFrancesco.91 Writing for a five-man majority, Justice Blackmun
noted that section 3576 was "a considered legislative attempt to attack a spe-
cific problem in our criminal justice system," 92 and held that the increase of
sentence on review violated neither the guarantee against multiple punishment
nor the guarantee against multiple trials. It is not possible to know whether
the Court relied on the fact that Congress had, in its mind, already considered
the issue carefully. It is interesting to note, however, that Justice Blackmun
adopted Professor Low's argument before the Senate,93 writing:
The exaltation of form over substance is to be avoided ...
Congress could have achieved the purpose of § 3576 by a slightly
different statute whose constitutionality would be unquestionable.
Congress might have provided that a defendant found to be a dan-
gerous special offender was to receive a specified mandatory term,
but that the trial court then could recommend a lesser sentence to the
court of appeals, which would be free to accept the recommendation
or to reject it. That scheme would offer no conceivable base for a
double jeopardy objection. Yet the impact on the defendant would
be exactly the same as, and possibly worse than, the impact under
§ 3576 as written. No double jeopardy policy is advanced by approv-
ing one of these procedures and declaring the other
unconstitutional.94
88. Id Congressman Eckhardt's response to Congressman Poll's statement was as follows:
[T]he gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Poll] is a man who is very learned in the law, as I
have frequently observed in colloquy on the floor. But he has exercised his great exper-
tise frequently to walk with exquisite precision on the very outside borders of the Consti-
tution. I think he has in this case overstepped.
Id at 35,287 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt). Congressman Eckhardt's opinion that the attempt to
attack crime had overstepped constitutional boundaries was shared by the opponents to S. 30.
89. Id at 35,363.
90. Id at 35,353 (statement of Rep. Mikva).
91. 449 U.S. 117 (1980). For a discussion of the DiFrancesco decision, see Note, Constitu-
tional Law-United States v. DiFrancesco: "Continuing Jeo!ardy"-An Old Concept Gains New
Lfe, 60 N.C.L. REv. 425 (1982).
92. 449 U.S. at 142.
93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
94. 449 U.S. at 142. That the majority viewed both alternatives as having the same double
jeopardy implications is surprising. Under § 3576 the defendant, after having faced the rigors of a
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In addition, like the congressional proponents of section 3576, Justice Black-
mun avoided the argument that in evaluating the double jeopardy claim
Pearce was concerned "not with increases in existing sentences, but with the
imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new trials." 95
This example reveals much about legislative and judicial behavior. Like
the 93d Congress, which enacted the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, the 91st Congress was quick to cite Supreme Court precedent, albeit
questionably on point, for support. As with the Senate discussion of the legis-
lative veto, those in favor of acting in the face of court decisions or against the
will of the majority stressed the need for Congress to make its own determina-
tions as to constitutionality. Similarly, just as the need to bring the adminis-
trative agencies under control was paramount, so was the need to enact a law
combatting organized crime-constitutional issues, while important, were not
given top priority. The effect these deliberations had on the Court is more
difficult to determine. Perhaps because both institutions agreed that section
3576 was constitutional, Justice Blackmun saw fit to mention the congressional
debates. The possibility exists, however, that the Court decided in part that its
work had been done already. What was at stake, of course, was an individ-
uars right to be free from double jeopardy.
In each of these examples Congress, for whatever reasons, decided that its
legislative agenda was in accord with the Constitution. In rethinking the is-
sues, the Supreme Court was faced not only with the task of deciding a consti-
tutional question, but also with the problem of confronting Congress if it
disagreed with the legislation. In assessing the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments, the Court overruled both its own prior decision and the legislative de-
termination. With section 3576 the Court narrowly upheld Congress'
trial and having had his sentence pronounced, can have his sentence increased or decreased upon
review. The double jeopardy problem exists if the sentence is increased because the defendant is
being given an extra punishment on the same set of facts. In Justice Blackmum's hypothetical,
such a risk does not exist because the sentence can only be decreased.
The dissent also criticizes this reasoning, but from a different angle. Justio Brennan wrote:
[Tihe Court argues that Congress could have provided that dangerous special offend-
ers be sentenced to a specified mandatory term that could then be reduced on appeal by
the court of appeals. Ante, at 142. The Court thus concludes that striking down § 3576
would elevate "form over substance" since Congress could have obtained the same result
sought by § 3576 "by a slightly different statute whose constitutionality would be un-
questionable." Ante, at 142. This is a strange conclusion, for we must review statutes as
they are written, not as they might have been written. In any event, the Court's hypo-
thetical legislation is not "slightly different," but substantially different from § 3576: it
would create a wholly unprecedented change in the relationship between trial and appel-
late courts. As long as Congress retains the present court structure in which the
sentences of trial courts are final judgments, the "form" as well as the "substance" of the
law militate against Government appeals in this situation.
Id at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722 (1969). The court's decision in DiFrancesco
is even more surprising in light of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), decided five
months later. In Bullington the Court decided, again 5-4, that the government may not seek an
increase in the defendant's penalty at a separate trial, even if that trial would have been held
anyway. For an analysis of the double jeopardy issue and a criticism that the Court's opinions are
inconsistent, see Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals
of CriminalSentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1980); Westen & Drubel, To ward a General Theory
ofDouble Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. Rv. 81.
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determination. The Court's decisions in Chadha and (if it decides to hear the
case) CECA will shed greater light on whether the Court looks to Congress
(under pressure) or the lower courts for a reading of the Constitution and the
question as to what, if any, importance the Court places on the congressional
constitutional deliberations themselves. While it is not possible to state that
injustice occurred in any of these situations, at the very least, one can say that
the oath to support and defend the Constitution is read differently by a mem-
ber of Congress than by a Justice of the Supreme Court.
II. CAN CONGRESS Do BETTER?
The examples in the previous section demonstrate that constitutional de-
cisions, if they are being made at all, are being made by the Supreme Court.
While constitutional rhetoric occasionally finds its way into the legislative his-
tory of a statute and may even convince some members of Congress to act in a
certain manner, for the most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to
enact any particular piece of legislation that fills the perceived needs of the
moment. If congressional supporters can draw on the Constitution to bolster
their case or to create the appearance of a reasonable decision, so much the
better. To conclude, however, that Congress has failed in its duty to "think
constitutionally" is not enough, for one must first determine whether the legis-
lature is able to engage effectively in constitutional debate and, assuming that
it is, what that debate might add to the one already undertaken by the
Supreme Court. I address the second question first.
A. Is There a Role for Congress?
In our republican form of government, the judiciary is the one branch
that is not able to set its own agenda. Restricted to deciding only live cases or
controversies, 96 the courts are dependent upon the executive and the legisla-
96. The Constitution gives jurisdiction to the judiciary in the following manner:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States,--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdic-
tion, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The courts are not empowered to give advisory opinions or entertain
abstract questions. As the Supreme Court noted in 1892,
Whenever, in pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by one
individual against another, there is presented a question involving the validity of any act
of any legislature, State or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the competency
of the legislature to so enact, the court must, in the exercise of its solemn duties, deter-
mine whether the act be constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the ulti-
[Vol. 61
CONGRESS .AND THE CONSTITUTION
tive branches for framing their disputes. To a large extent, Congress serves as
a screen for the Supreme Court-if Congress only passes constitutional laws,
the Court's role is reduced to that of statutory interpreter. For Congress, the
task is relatively easy when the constitutional issues are clear. In considering
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Congress acted with reference
to the perceived mandate of the Supreme Court.97 When the constitutionality
of an act is undetermined, the task is harder. It is in these instances that Con-
gress has a tendency to decide the issue in favor of the legislation's constitu-
tionality. The question that arises is how Congress should make this
determination.
In making constitutional judgments, Congress has four alternatives: it
can engage in the same kind of constitutional reasoning that is performed by
the judiciary; it can try a doubtful constitutional theory on the assumption that
if the constitutional experiment is wrong, the courts can be relied upon to set
Congress right; it can identify one particular constitutional principle and pro-
tect that principle on the theory that the legislature determines the constitu-
tional framework within which the courts must adjudicate; finally, it can err
on the side of constitutional conservatism and construe its own powers nar-
rowly. While it is not within the scope of this discussion to determine when
each alternative should be used, it is helpful to understand the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
The first approach forces Congress to act as a lower federal court, reading
and interpreting Supreme Court precedent. In the easy cases, congressional
review aids the Court by obviating the need to hear the case, except, of course,
if the Court wishes to make a change in the law. In the harder cases, however,
if Congress has resolved the issue in favor of constitutionality, the Court can-
not avoid confronting the issue directly. Acting like a lower federal court is
certainly not what Jefferson envisioned for Congress; Congress should be able
to make its own decisions rather than having to predict what the Supreme
Court would do-a function that is presumably already being performed by
the judicial system.
The second option, testing doubtful constitutional theories, can work only
if Congress considers in advance what it will do if the Court resolves the issue
against constitutionality. Because of the co-equal relationship between Con-
gress and the courts, any experimentation by Congress places great pressure
on the courts to follow the election returns or face a loss of jurisdiction. That
pressure only increases if Congress asserts and insists on, rather that merely
suggests, doubtful theories.98 If Congress explicitly states that it is testing a
mate and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals.
It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legisla-
ture could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act.
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
98. The seminal example of this phenomenon is the Supreme Court's consideration of Presi-
dent's Roosevelt's New Deal programs. Although the programs were enacted under constitutional
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new theory, the Court is able to be more objective. While the courts should
accord congressional determinations their due respect, constitutional experi-
mentation should not be given the same deference as that accorded Congress
in "one step at a time" cases,99 in which Congress is also engaged in the pro-
cess of testing. Doubtfulness aside, the congressional theory is either constitu-
tional or it is not-there is no middle ground. Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that the Constitution is a living document that evolves over time;
pressure on the Court from Congress to reevaluate the meaning of the Consti-
tution is not always detrimental.
The third approach for Congress, protecting one particular constitutional
principle, such as individual rights, state sovereignty, or separation of pow-
ers,100 is helpful to the courts because it clarifies congressional motive and
may also determine the contours of a constitutional right. Congressional moti-
vation is often hard to assess, however, because the members frequently can-
not agree on which principle is paramount, or they see the Constitution as
embodying several co-equal principles. Because the structure of legislation
can dictate the shape of challenges to it and frame the issues before a court, the
clearer the terms of what Congress is trying to do, the better.
The fourth method is really not a viable option because it places Congress
in a role subsidiary to the courts. Were Congress to interpret the Constitution
narrowly at every instance it would not be an innovative force in government
and would block the will of the majority from becoming known. By com-
pletely eliminating the tension between Congress and the courts over who de-
cides what is constitutional, Congress would, in effect, place the courts in an
even worse position; political forces for change that formerly operated on
Congress would be refocused on the courts.
Thus, it appears that Congress can make a difference. It can screen the
easy cases by rejecting unconstitutional bills; it can provide a different view-
point on the Constitution and become an innovative force; and it can help
frame the constitutional issues by clarifying its motivation and structuring the
legislation to take account of that motivation. While the extent to which it fills
these roles varies greatly, the potential for congressional input into constitu-
tional judgments remains.
theories that were new at the time, both the President and Congress thought these theories were
viable. When the Court disagreed, Roosevelt proposed packing the Court. Many historians be-
lieve that as a result of this threat the Court backed down and accepted Roosevelt's theories. This
change in heart also signaled the demise of the doctrine of substantive due process. For an histori-
cal account, see FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE SUPREME COURT (A. Cope & F. Krinsky eds.
1952).
99. For an interesting discussion of the Court's approach to these cases and a suggestion for
reform, see Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justflcation in Equal Protection Cases, 90
YALE LJ. 1777 (1981). This method differs from proposed constitutional experimentation because
although classifications that are timebound are involved, they are not yet unconstitutional. Id
100. This approach has been adopted by Justice Rehnquist; in his opinions the principle of
state sovereignty is protected above all else. See Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE LJ. 1317 (1982).
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B. Can Congress Fill that Role?
While it is clear that there is a role for Congress to play in making consti-
tutional judgments, the ability of Congress to do so is less certain. Both insti-
tutionally and politically, Congress is designed to pass over the constitutional
questions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts. Congress' hesitancy to
tackle these issues can be seen in a quick reading of any volume of the Con-
gressional Record. Even from the earliest years of the Republic, the Congres-
sional Record casts little light on the great constitutional debates that have
periodically divided the country.
The paucity of constitutional dialogue in Congres is due to many factors.
Structurally, both houses are large, making the process of engaging in complex
arguments during a floor debate difficult. For the most part, the speeches
made on the floor are designed to get a member's position on the record rather
than to initiate a dialogue. Because of the volume of legislation, the time spent
with constituents, and the technical knowledge required to understand the
background of every piece of legislation, it is infrequent that a member consid-
ers the individual merits of a particular bill.10I Often a vote is determined by
a thumbs up-or-down sign by the party leader,102 or by a political debt that
needs to be repaid. While it is true, as Senator Schmitt observed, that a major-
ity of the members of Congress are lawyers,' 03 they have not kept up-to-date
on recent legal developments. In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never
come to the attention of Congress.14 Unlike judges, the Representatives and
Senators are almost totally dependent on the recommendations of others in
making constitutional judgments.
Congress is a reactive body unable to enact legislation until the problem
at hand reaches crisis proportions.'05 Because of this, the legislature has an
"often unstated but [very] real need to deal with each issue that comes before
it in as timely a fashion as possible," even at the expense of developing thor-
ough and accurate legislation.1 6 Driven by a need to get a law on the books,
Congress is not primarily concerned with the law's details. Constitutional is-
sues are subsidiary to the desire to crack down on crime or bring administra-
tive agencies under control, for example. In addition, the constitutional
principles involved in a bill, unlike its merits, are generally abstract, unpopu-
101. See, e.g., J. HARRIS, CONGRESS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 162 (1972) ("Congress is
not organized to formulate a broad, consistent, national legislative program dealing with the
problems of the time."); Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking--Judges Who Can't andLegislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 801 (1963) (because members of Congress spend at least half of
their time on constituents, they can give full attention only to a limited number of issues);
Schwarz, Legislation and Legislatures, 47 Soc. INQUIRY 234, 236 (1977) ("legislators have little
time to discuss and consider legislation").
102. Rep. John Brademas, former Democratic Whip in Congress, was famous for standing in
the doorway as the members entered from the cloakroom for a vote and, in this manner, signaled
the proper way to vote.
103. 128 CONo. REc. S2581 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of Sen. Schmitt).
104. S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 144 (1965).
105. See J. HARRIS, supra note 101, at 19; Note, supra note 99, at 1786.
106. Note, supra note 99, at 1781; see also Morse, Theories ofLegislation, 14 DE PAUL L. REV.
51, 53 (1964).
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lar, and fail to capture the imagination of either the media or the public. The
Constitution is often portrayed as an obstacle to a better society by Congress-
men forced to confront its limitations.
In addition to the institutional pressures on the Congress to pass the con-
stitutional problems to the courts, the political incentives to do so are great.
Constitutional issues often present the most difficult value conflicts in society.
The very knowledge that the courts are there, as the ultimate nay-sayers, in-
creases the tendency to pass the issue on, particularly if it is politically contro-
versial. Such behavior by Congress is both an abdication of its role as a
constitutional guardian and an abnegation of its duty of responsible lawmak-
ing. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Congress has only infrequently
demonstrated a concern for constitutional limitations.
III. CONCLUSION
The recent spate of bills seeking to remove jurisdiction from the federal
courts indicates that Congress is not completely happy with the Supreme
Court's handling of certain constitutional matters.' 07 Congress, however, has
not been a model of constitutional decisionmaking itself. Its hallmark has
been superficial and, for the most part, self-serving constitutional debate.
What then can be said of Congress and the Constitution?
As a decisionmaking body Congress is not designed to consider ade-
quately the constitutional implications of every bill before it. While the dan-
gers inherent in such a situation are great, they have not been realized. The
most helpful task that Congress can perform is to clarify its intentions and its
perception of the problem. If Congress is operating against a constitutional
background, it should note how that background accords with the statutory
scheme. If it ducks the issue, it should be honest and say so. The most likely
place for constitutional dialogue is in the committees; committee size and for-
mat are more conducive to debate. Even so, the urgency of the issues, the
reliance of members on others for guidance, and the complexity of the
problems presented often prevent meaningful congressional constitutional
analysis.
While congressional constitutional debate aids the courts by identifying
issues and motivation, it is not a substitute for the judgment of the courts. The
courts must play their unique apolitical role and make the hard decisions.
Congress could be more cognizant of the fact that many times it backs the
courts into a corner and should not be so quick to point an accusing finger in
the courts' direction. On the other hand, the courts need to remember that
confrontation with the policy-makers puts the delicate nature of the separation
of powers to great stress. An independent judiciary can remain that way only
if the other branches accept the importance of its independence.
Members of Congress should strive to be Jefferson's independent guardi-
ans but should remember that the system was designed to give the courts the
107. See supra note 10.
[Vol. 61
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
final say. At the very least, however, they should remember that their consti-
tutional oath is not just a ceremonial ritual but an entrusting to their care of a
document that gives this republic its unique longevity. As Judge Bryce said
almost a century ago,
The people are profoundly attached to the form which their national
life has taken. The Federal Constitution is, to their eyes, an almost
sacred thing, an Ark of the Covenant, whereon no man may lay rash
hands . . . . This conservative spirit, jealously watchful even in
small matters, sometimes prevents reforms, but it assures to the peo-
ple an easy mind, and a trust in their future which they feel to be not
only a present satisfaction but a reservoir of strength. 0 8
108. 2 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 433 (abr. 1959).
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